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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(2)(h).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the Trial Court abused its discretion by awarding each of the

parties their pre-marital properties and contributions during the marriage.
2.

Whether the Trial Court abused its discretion by placing the parties back to

their pre-marital status.1
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The trial court must first determine what property is separate and what property is
marital. These issues present questions of law which are reviewed for correctness.
Jeffreys v. Jeffreys, 895 P.2d 835, 836 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); Bradford v. Bradford, 1999
Utah App. 373, 993 P.2d 887. In the allocation of property, the court has considerable
discretion and will be upheld unless clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion is
demonstrated. Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). The Trial
Court's findings will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous, or a mistake has
been made. Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1317 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner, Marjorie Hayes ("Margee"), filed a Complaint for Divorce requesting
dissolution of her approximate five-year marriage to Arthur ("Chuck") Hayes. The issues
tried by the District Court concerned Marjorie Hayes' request to be awarded a portion of
Chuck Hayes' pre-marital property, which the Trial Court denied, and an equitable
1

Each of the Court's decisions achieved the same results.
1

allocation of marital property. Alimony, child support and custody were not at issue.
The Trial Court returned to each party, as best it could, their separate pre-marital
properties and contributions from separate properties, and, in doing so, returned the
parties to their pre-marital financial status. Marjorie Hayes appealed from the District
Court's Order.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Petitioner Marjorie Hayes, age 47, and Respondent Chuck Hayes, age 60,

separated on or about November 10, 2003 after four years and 10 months of marriage.
(App.Ad. A,R. 811,ffl[3,5, 6).2
2.

The marriage, a first for each party, produced one child, Cheyanna, whose

care and custody was not at issue.
3.

As of the date of marriage, Chuck had acquired and accumulated a

substantial pre-marital estate valued at $1.1 million, consisting of the following:
a.

Equity in a beach-front home located in West Hampton Beach, New
York, acquired in 1975, known as the Dune Road property, valued at
$600,000. (App. Ad. A., R. 821, | 38.)

b.

Proceeds from the sale of a residential property located in Florida,
valued at $106,000. (App. Ad. A., R. 821, H 39.)

c.

Proceeds from the sale of a residential property located in Quoque,
New York, valued at $349,000. {Id. at If 37.)

d.

Savings totaling $60,000. {Id. at If 40.)

2

All references to the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree are to
Appellant's Addendum).
2

4.

As of the date of marriage, Petitioner had also acquired and accumulated a

substantial pre-marital estate consisting of the following:

5.

a.

A Park City condominium with an existing $55,000 mortgage. (Id.
at 142.)

b.

A Chicago condominium sold shortly after the marriage valued at
$60,000. (Ttf. atf 41.)

c.

Equity in a Sun Valley, Idaho residential property, valued at
$90,000. {Id at Tj 44.)

d.

Certain retirement, deferred compensation, 401(K) and IRA benefits.

e.

Financial and brokerage accounts. (Id. at lfl[ 45-52.)

f.

Furniture, personal effects and an automobile.

From the time Chuck Hayes left his full-time employment with Chemical

Bank in 1978 until his marriage in 1998, he was self-employed as a real estate developer.
He lived in, rehabilitated and remodeled residential properties, and used the equity from
those properties to pay his living expenses and the expenses of improving his real estate
investments. (Id. at R. 833, \ 93.)
6.

All of Chuck Hayes' pre-marital net worth was acquired through the

development of real estate properties over the twenty years preceding his marriage. (Id.)
7.

The parties agreed, prior to their marriage, that Chuck Hayes would

continue his primary residential development business and, in doing so, this would
provide a home for the parties.

3

8.

Following the marriage Chuck Hayes located and purchased a lot in the

Aerie Development in Park City, Utah and, acting as general contractor, began to design
and construct a home. (Id. at R. 826, H 61, 62.)
9.

The lot and construction of the Aerie home cost approximately $700,000

(Id at 163.)
10.

Chuck Hayes contributed $619,000 from the sale proceeds of his separate

assets (^65) and Marjorie Hayes contributed $79,000 from the sale proceeds of her
separate assets (1 69) to the construction of the Aerie home.
11.

Similar to all his prior real estate projects, the Aerie home was titled in

Chuck's name.
12.

The Aerie home was sold for the net amount of $711,628 (1 64), thus

producing a potential net marital equity of $13,628 over the parties' pre-marital
contributions. (Id at H 104, 105; App. Ad. C, R. 630 1 8.)
13.

The Court found (Id at R. 824-825, H 53, 67) that it was fair and

reasonable that both parties be awarded their pre-marital properties and contributions.
14.

With the exception of Margee's condominium, the parties always kept

separate accounts of their individual assets and/or earnings, never opened joint accounts,
and maintained titles to their separate properties in their own names. (App. Ad. C, R.
635,12.)
15.

Chuck Hayes traced his contributions into the Aerie home directly from the

sale proceeds of the Florida property ($106,000), the Quoque, Long Island property
($349,000), and his separate pre-marital funds ($60,000). He also sold a 50% interest in
4

the Dune Road property to Marjorie's parents for the sum of $325,000 which was used,
in part, for his remaining contribution in the Aerie home. (App. Ad., R. 825, Tf 55.)
16.

Chuck Hayes raised $840,000 from the sale of his pre-marital properties

and of that amount he contributed $619,000 into the Aerie home and $55,000 into
Marjorie's Park City condominium (by paying off the mortgage). The remaining
$166,000 was expended on furniture, living expenses, tax payments for all properties and
other family expenses incurred during the marriage. (Id. at R. 827, If 65.)
17.

Shortly after the marriage Chuck Hayes paid off the $55,000 remaining

mortgage on Marjorie's Park City condominium, not as a gift, but as a business decision
(/rf. at R. 822, f 43.)
18.

Approximately one year later, Marjorie deeded her interest in the Park City

condominium to Chuck as a Joint Tenant. (Id. at R. 833, *| 94.) (Petitioner concedes and
the Trial Court found, her Park City condominium became marital property by her acts.
(Id at R. 835,1 10; Petitioner's Brief, p. 19.)
19.

Chuck Hayes also paid off most of the property taxes on the Park City

condominium, improved and maintained that condominium and purchased furnishings
and other items for the condominium. (App. Ad. A., R. 834, ^ 99.)
20.

As of the date of trial, but before recognition of each parties' separate

contributions, the Court found that the following items were subject to distribution by the
Court:
a.

$644,000 after payment of marital debts and expenses, remaining
from the sale of the Aerie home consisting of:
5

i.
ii.
b.

$381,000 equitable value of a lot on Little Kate Road;
escrowed funds equal to $263,000.3

The Park City condominium, appraised at $150,000 as of the date of
trial.

c.

Three vehicles and a four-wheeler with a gross value of $35,600.

d.

The marital portion of Marjorie's 401(K) contribution in the amount
of $27,215. (App. Ad. B, R. 842, |18i.)

Total value, excluding the 401(K) contribution4 and before credit for traced premarital contributions, equaled $829,600.
21.

The Trial Court concluded that each party should be awarded and credited

their pre-marital contributions as follows:
To Respondent: $674,500. ($619,000 to the Aerie home and $55,000 to the Park
City condomimium.)
To Petitioner: $174,000. ($79,000 contribution to the Aerie home and $95,000 to
the Park City condominium, valued at $150,000.) (App. A. B, R. 842, f 18.)
22.

Each party was awarded one-half of the increase in Petitioner's 401(K)

23.

Petitioner was awarded her automobile.

24.

Respondent was awarded the remaining vehicles, worth $34,400.

plan.

3

The balance of the net sale proceeds from Aerie was used, with consent of the parties
and the Trial Court, for the payment of taxes, marital obligations and living expenses
before trial.
4
The marital portion was equally divided by a Qualified Domestic Relations Order.
6

25.

Because the total value of all pre-marital contributions equaled $848,500

and the total value of property subject to distribution only equaled $829,600, the Court
determined that each party should bear equal responsibility for the deficit, and therefore
reduced each parties' reimbursement by $9,450. (See 1(19 of the Conclusions; App. Ad.
B, R. 842.)
26.

After backing out each parties' separate contribution, there was no marital

equity left to divide.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I.

The Trial Court correctly determined what properties were separate, which

separate properties were contributed by each party toward the acquisition of marital
properties, but maintained their separate character, and what marital properties were
acquired. Appellant does not dispute these findings, nor does she appeal from the Trial
Court's determinations.
The Trial Court may credit either party's separate contributions before an equal
division of the marital property. See Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
After crediting each party with their separate contributions, there was no marital
property left to divide. This placed the parties back into their financial status as of the
date of marriage, which the Court found to be just and reasonable in light of the evidence,
findings and circumstances of the parties. Cox v. Cox, 877 P.2d 1262 (Utah Ct. App.
1994).
II.

The Trial Court correctly awarded to Chuck Hayes his pre-marital Dune

Road property and all of its appreciated value after finding that all such appreciation was
7

the result of market forces, not the efforts of Chuck or Margee Hayes. The Court also
found that Margee's claims to the enhanced value were not sufficient to entitle her to
share in the appreciation of Dune Road.
III.

Any claim that the Court made assumptions unsupported by the evidence

regarding Margee Hayes' possibility of benefiting or inheriting her parents' portion of
Dune Road is, at worst, "harmless" with the Court having explained that its comments
were not determinative of the issues.
IV.

The Trial Court did not err by the use of values determined as of the date of

trial. It is within the Court's discretion to determine dates of valuation.
ARGUMENT I
I.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN AWARDING SEPARATE
PROPERTIES
Petitioner combines two separate and distinct issues in her first Argument from

which she appeals the Trial Court's decision claiming: 1) the Trial Court failed to award
Margee 50% of the gross marital property; and 2) the Trial Court should have divided
Chuck Hayes' interest in the appreciation of his pre-marital property. Petitioner then
reargues her pre-marital claim in Point III of her brief. For clarity, Respondent must
respond to these arguments separately.
A.

DIVISION OF MARITAL PROPERTY.

By complaining that the Trial Court abused its discretion in unequally distributing
the marital estate, Petitioner makes the conceptual and misleading mistake of comparing
the valuations of the parties' pre- and post- separate estates, together with their marital

8

estates. This is an indirect way of complaining that the District Court should not have
held that the parties' separate contributions remained their separate contributions, a
finding that Petitioner neither objected to nor appealed from. The court's conclusions in
this regard are amply supported by specific and detailed findings. (See B, infra, p. 12.) It
is misleading because at first glance it appears that Margee received one-third of the
estate while Chuck received two-thirds. It is not until later in the Appellant's brief that
one understands the tables of awarded property include separate and marital properties
combined.
Viewed in a more logical manner, the parties' circumstances going into the
marriage are fairly simple and direct. Chuck Hayes had his Dune Road Property and
significant cash from the recent sale of pre-marital properties totaling $515,000. Within
one year, he had sold a one-half interest in Dune Road to Margee's parents thereby
increasing his pre-marital and separate funds to $865,000.
After the divorce, Chuck Hayes continued to hold his one-half interest in Dune
Road and received credit for his traced and separate contributions worth $665,050. Thus,
Chuck Hayes' post-divorce liquid financial status was approximately $200,000 less than
it was at the date of marriage.
As of the date of marriage, Margee Hayes owned her Park City condominium with
a mortgage balance of $55,000 and cash of $60,000 from the recent sale of her Chicago
condominium. After the divorce, Margee Hayes was awarded the same Park City
condominium, now free and clear of any mortgage, together with additional cash in the
amount of $14,550 and all of her other pre-marital properties. Thus, Margee Hayes'
9

post-divorce financial status actually increased by $9,550 ($55,000 (paid mortgage) +
$14,550 (cash) - $60,000 (pre-marital cash) = $9,550).
A fair comparison of the parties' circumstances thus reveals that Chuck's premarital net worth declined by $200,000, while Margee's increased by $9,550.
The comparisons argued by Margee Hayes vastly confuse the issue by comparing
pre- and post-marriage date values of non-marital properties. The Court specifically
found that Chuck's interest in Dune Road was pre-marital and its increase in value was
due solely to market forces. (App. Ad. A, R. 826, f 59.) The property itself did not
change. Similarly, Margee's interest in her pre-marital properties had not changed and
were not valued by the District Court because they fall under the same general rule
announced in Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988), awarding each
party's pre-marital property, "together with any appreciation or enhancement of its
value". Margee still owned the Sun Valley property, her brokerage and financial
accounts, her furniture, furnishings and other properties. She was also awarded the same
Park City condominium she had prior to the date of the marriage. The only change is that
she now owned her condominium free and clear of a $55,000 mortgage.
Margee complains that the Court failed to award her 50% of marital property but
supports that claim by comparing all property, separate and marital. Once each parties'
pre-marital and separate contributions are separated, it becomes apparent there is no
marital estate to divide. {See C infra,)
The trial court is afforded considerable latitude in adjusting financial and property
interests, and its decisions are given the presumption of validity, overcome only upon a
10

showing of a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law, resulting in substantial and
prejudicial error, if the evidence clearly preponderates against the findings, or if a serious
inequity has resulted manifesting a clear abuse of discretion. Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d
1, 5 (Utah 1992); Thomas v. Thomas, 375 Utah Adv. Rpt. 23 (Utah 1999).
The parties and the court all agree that the gross value of property subject to
distribution as separate and marital property in this matter consists of:
1)

The Aerie home, which was sold during the divorce proceedings, and the

proceeds applied to the Little Kate lot worth $381,000, and $263,000 placed in escrow;
2)

The Park City condominium worth $150,000; and

3)

Vehicles totaling $35,600.

Total value of property to be divided: $829,600.
Petitioner claims one-half of this $829,600 should have been awarded to her
($414,800), either before crediting the parties for their separate contributions, or without
regard to either party's separate contributions.
Petitioner's methodology, however, has been specifically rejected by the Court of
Appeals in Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), (reversing a trial court's
award of 50% of the net equity in the parties' home and then requiring the husband to
reimburse the wife's separate contributions to that home from his share of the divided
marital property). Unless the parties' separate contributions are reimbursed from the
proceeds before a division of the remaining marital property, one party would not receive
his or her presumptive equal share of marital property or his separate contribution.

11

Petitioner's argument confuses the concept of marital property by presupposing
that once it's designated as marital, the entire estate must be divided equally before
reimbursing, crediting, or "backing out" the separate non-marital portions. The Hall v.
Hall decision clearly requires, absent extraordinary findings to the contrary, an equal
division of the marital estate after first subtracting the amount necessary to reimburse
separate contributions. This is the method followed by the Trial Court in this matter.
B.

PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO SHARE NON-MARITAL
PROPERTY.

By arguing that Margee is entitled to 50% of all property, even the increased value
of Dune Road, Petitioner disregards the Court's specific findings that each party made
separate contributions (Findings, f*H 65, 69), that the Court traced these contributions
directly from the sale of pre-marital properties into their separate accounts (Appellant's
Statement of Fact, ^f 18, 21, 22, 27, 38 and 39); that the parties agreed before the
marriage that Chuck Hayes would, and could, continue his 20-year history of reinvesting
his separate properties into primary residential properties; that certain of these
investments were "business decisions," not gifts of property into the marital estate; that
Chuck Hayes intended by his acts to maintain the separate character of his pre-marital
properties; that Chuck Hayes did not intend to deed the Aerie home as joint property, or
to lose the separate character of his pre-marital contributions to that home (App. Ad. B,
R. 841-842, m 14-16.)
Petitioner has failed to marshal the evidence, or to suggest how the Trial Court's
findings were bereft of significant value in finding and concluding that Chuck Hayes'

12

pre-marital property, including the appreciation thereof, and his separate contributions
remained separate and not marital. Petitioner generalizes the result as simply
"inequitable" upon a literal interpretation of the term "marital property." Clearly, the
Court made significant, uncontroverted findings of separate, non-marital properties and
contributions, which justify the Court's decision in extraordinary detail.
C.

THERE IS NO MARITAL ESTATE TO DIVIDE.

Given the Court's uncontested findings of separate property and the Court's
appropriate and customary treatment of that property, the net marital estate created a
deficit as follows:
1)

Gross marital property to be divided:
Less Credit for Petitioner's separate property:
Less Credit for Respondent's separate property:
NET DEFICIT:

$829,600
($174,000)
($674,000)
($ 18,400).

This deficit was equally allocated by the court and reduced each party's distribution by
$9,200. In light of Respondent's loss from his pre-marital status, an equal share of this
deficit can hardly be described as inequitable.
D.

PETITIONER RECEIVED MORE THAN SHE WAS ENTITLED,

All parties agree, and the district court's findings hold, that the Park City
condominium was marital property by reason of Petitioner unilaterally deeding it into
joint tenancy. Utah law provides that a spouse may transfer her interest in separately
acquired property into the marital estate. Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-3 (1953, as amended).
This is generally presumed to be a gift and when coupled with the intent to do so,
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transforms the property into marital property. Bradford v. Bradford, 1999 Utah App.
373, 993 P.2d 887.
Had the Trial Court maintained treatment of the Park City condominium as marital
property and not returned each party's separate contributions to the condominium, the
separate contributions each party would have received would have been: (a) $619,000 to
Respondent solely from the Aerie property and (b) $79,000 to Petitioner solely from the
Aerie property. Total $698,000. This would have left a positive net marital estate of
$131,600.5 Assuming the court had equally divided that marital estate, as the law
requires, each party would have received $65,500 in addition to their separate
contributions. This results in distributions to Petitioner of $65,500 in marital property,
and $79,000 in separate property, totaling $144,500.
By not treating the Park City condominium as marital, the Petitioner received back
her Park City condominium, ($90,000) and the $79,000 separate contribution she made
into the Aerie property. This $164,800 award was $20,300 more than if the court had
recognized the Park City condominium as marital. If any error can be assigned to the
trial judge, it is the Court's treatment of the Park City condominium as being non-marital
when in fact all parties agreed, and the court found, that it was marital.
The Court initially expressed its reasoning by suggesting it denied Margee's
request for a share of Chuck Hayes' non-marital appreciation in Dune Road, and chose
instead to back out what each party had separately contributed to both properties, as a fair

5

($829,600 less 698,000 = $131,600).
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and equitable resolution. (R. 638.)6 As demonstrated above, this allocation gave Margee
at least $20,000 more. Respondent could have appealed the failure of the Court to divide
the condominium as marital property, but is aware of the Court's equitable powers to
divide all property as it deems reasonable, given all of the determinations of facts made
by the Trial Court. Accordingly, neither party should fault the Trial Court's adoption of
more than one hundred findings which support its equitable allocation of property.
E.

RETURN TO PRE-MARITAL STATUS.

The Trial Court's choice to return both parties' separate contributions, thus
returning them to their pre-marital status, was explained in depth in its Memorandum
Decision and supported by findings, evidence and conclusions . In Cox v. Cox, 877 P.2d
1262 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's attempt
to restore the parties to their pre-marital status even though the wife had deeded her premarital home in joint tenancy to her husband. The Court, relying on Jesperson v.
Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah 1980) and Georgedes v. Georgedes, 627 P.2d 44, 45
(Utah 1981), listed a number of factors which support a trial judge: 1) a marriage of short
duration; 2) a couple married later in life; 3) the amount and kind of property to be
divided; 4) whether the property was acquired before the marriage; 5) the source of the
property; 6) the health of the parties; 7) the standard of living; 8) the respective financial
conditions; 9) needs and earning capacity; 10) the ages at the time of the marriage and
divorce; 11) what each may have given up during the marriage. See also Bradford v.

6

This issue was then fully briefed and argued by the parties before the Trial Court on
Margee's motions and objections (See Tr. Beginning at R. 886, R. 672 and R. 686.)
15

Bradford, 1999 Utah App. 373, 993 P.2d 887; Hogue v. Hogue, 831 P.2d 120, 122 (Utah
ClApp.

1992).
In deciding to return the parties to their pre-marital status, the Trial Court detailed,

first in its memorandum decision, that:
1) the marriage was short-term (R. 627, f 4);
2) the Petitioner had received a major benefit during the marriage by Respondent
paying the taxes on all properties and substantial sums toward family utilities,
activities of the family and child, and many other expenses (R. 633, f 20);
3) the parties are older and each brought substantial property to the marriage (R.
635);
4) the parties clearly intended that their properties remain separate (R. 635);
5) the parties kept separate accounts with no joint accounts at any time (R. 635);
6) the Respondent's actions were not a reflection of an intention to co-mingle his
separate property;
7) the Respondent had no separate retirement benefits and his pre-marital savings
constituted his entire estate;
8) the marriage was a first for each and each married later in life. The implication
that Respondent, at 60 years of age, may not have other children and had no
prior children, together with Chuck Hayes' testimony that his daughter would
be his only beneficiary, limits one's concern that a child was born as issue of
this marriage; (App. Ad. D, p. 374.)

16

9) the Park City condominium previously owned by the Petitioner was her only
Utah residence at the time of the divorce;
10)the Petitioner's needs were met by her job with Delta Airlines, income from
invested sources and other properties held such as her now valuable Sun Valley
condominium, together with her retirement plans and benefits (Cox v. Cox, 877
P.2d at 1269);
The Trial Court clearly considered the factors set forth in Cox v. Cox, supra, and
supported that decision with sufficient evidence. The Petitioner suggested that the Trial
Court abused that discretion by failing to adopt findings which demonstrate the step used
by the Trial Court to reach its decision. The exercise of the Trial Court's equitable
powers is both a question of law and fact. Yet, where the Petitioner has failed to marshal
the evidence, the appeals court may accept the facts found by the trial court in its
Memorandum Decision and in its Findings of Fact. Cox v. Cox, supra at p. 1270.
Clearly, the Trial Court acted property and within its discretion.
The Trial Court could have distributed Marjorie's Park City condominium as
marital property but chose not to do so as a benefit to Petitioner. Margee in fact
benefited, as demonstrated, by $20,300, and should have no room to complain that the
court failed to exercise its discretion as provided by law.
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ARGUMENT II
THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY AWARDING
CHUCK HAYES HIS PRE-MARITAL INTEREST IN THE DUNE
ROAD PROPERTY
Petitioner has correctly stated Utah law relating to the characterization of separate
property and the parties' entitlement to maintain that separate property, together with its
appreciation, in a divorce proceeding. The Dune Road property, having been acquired
some twenty-three years before the marriage, was pre-marital property. Chuck testified
he endured twelve years of litigation with the United States government, rebuilt and
remodeled the home several times, all before this marriage. The Court found, based on
competent, uncontroverted evidence that any appreciation during the marriage was solely
attributable to market forces, not anything either party did during the marriage to improve
the property. (App. Ad. C, R. 627-630, f 7.)
Trial courts have been directed to distribute property between parties in a fair and
systematic fashion. Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1172 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Once the
court properly categorizes the property as part of the marital estate or as the separate
property of one or the other, the court may apply the presumed entitlement to each party
by awarding all of his or her separate property and fifty percent of the marital property.
Id. at 1172. If there are exceptional circumstances that require alternate treatment, the
court may effect an equitable distribution in light of the circumstances if the court enters
adequate findings memorializing a departure from these general principles. Mortensen v.
Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988); Neumeyer v. Neumeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1278, n.l
(Utah 1987).
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In order to lay proper claim to the Dune Road property, Petitioner must
demonstrate that the property was either co-mingled, the Petitioner, by her efforts,
significantly augmented, maintained or protected the separate property, or the distribution
failed to achieve a full, just and equitable result. Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1320
(Utah Ct. App. 1990).
On this issue Petitioner recognizes her obligation to marshal the substantial
evidence upon which the Trial Court relied in finding that Chuck Hayes' interest in the
Dune Road property remained his separate property. However, Petitioner misperceives
her second burden of demonstrating that, despite this marshaled evidence, the findings
are "so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of evidence and therefore
clearly erroneous." Kraus v. Kraus, 817 P.2d 836, 838 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Watson v.
Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 6 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Petitioner simply re-argues that her cited
findings preponderate against the marshaled findings; this does not rise to a level
necessary to overcome the district court's determinations. Petitioner must show, while
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the findings, the evidence is
insufficient to support the findings. Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84, 88 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989).
Petitioner also asserts without reference to the record that Chuck could not have
built the Aerie home without selling 50% of Dune Road. Yet on that same page,
Petitioner refers to Chuck's testimony on page 411 of Addendum D: "I had a lot of
options. I could have mortgaged it and built 938. I could have sold it outright. . ."
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Petitioner's sole claim appears to be based upon the fact that she suggested her
parents purchase a one-half interest in the Dune Road property, which allowed Chuck
Hayes sufficient cash assets to complete the home in Park City, Utah, and to maintain his
remaining one-half separate interest. Petitioner speculates thett had she not suggested7 her
parents buy Chuck's one-half interest, he could not have raised the financing necessary to
complete the Aerie home, nor would he be in a position to reap the benefits of the
substantial appreciation his one-half interest in Dune Road experienced after the sale.
Respondent testified, and the court found, (App. Ad. C, R. 627-630, ^ 7) that he
could have sold all or a portion of the property, he could have mortgaged or obtained
financing using Dune Road or the Aerie property, or he could have sold all or a portion to
others. His decision to sell fifty percent to her parents remained his own decision, related
to his own property, and related to the continuation of his separate business of building
and developing primary residential properties.
The most that can be attributed to Petitioner's "suggestion" is that a substantial
benefit inured to her parents, who were allowed to purchase a fifty percent interest in a
property that Chuck Hayes had worked on, litigated over, rebuilt and renovated
throughout a period of twenty-three years prior to the parties' marriage. It was Margee's
parents who received the significant benefit of a $700,000 increase in the value of their
investment and it was that ownership which allowed Margee to spend as much as four
months a year vacationing at this beachfront property. To the extent that she did any

7

Petitioner uses the word "brokered" on page 15 of her Brief. This legal concept has not
been used or suggested anywhere in the record below.
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clean-up or any "maintenance", the court determined that she had done so for her own
use, or for the benefit of her parents, but it was clearly not significant enough to
overcome the huge pre-marital contribution made by Chuck Hayes. Margee's claim that
she cared for or protected the property did not rise to the significant level reflected in
Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 307: ".. .unless the other spouse ... has
significantly cared for, protected or preserved it, thereby acquiring an equitable interest in
the property".
The Court's specific finding that the value and appreciation of the Dune Road
property occurred not by reason of either party's contribution from and after the date of
the marriage, but solely because of market forces, meant that Margee Hayes had no claim
to any appreciation in the value of the separate marital property since none of that
appreciation was attributable to any work performed by Chuck or Margee Hayes during
the marriage. Burke v. Burke, 733. P.2d 133 (Utah 1987).
ARGUMENT III
MARGEE'S CLAIM THAT THE COURT RELIED UPON
INFORMATION OUTSIDE THE RECORD IS HARMLESS.
Margee complains of the Court's initial belief, expressed in the Memorandum
Opinion that Margee may receive a benefit from Dune Road in the future. The District
Court explained that the benefit to which he referred was the benefit of her continued use
of that property through her family's fifty percent ownership following the divorce.
Dune Road had not sold as of the date of divorce and there was no evidence that Mrs.
Hayes would not continue to use that property as a member of her parents' family.
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Believing the statement guided the Court's determinations, Margee objected to the
conclusion as not being supported by the evidence and sought to admit an affidavit from
Margee's parents that they had no plans to dispose of this property by gift or inheritance.
The Court clearly explained that no direct evidence of inheritance was received, but felt
that future advantage would not be an improper implication based upon certain facts in
the record. Those facts included, as the Court explained, Margee's use of the Dune Road
property for as much as four months during the year. The evidence also suggested that
Margee had received substantial gifts from her parents (Trial Tr. R. 884 at p. 93).
Margee's mother unilaterally placed Margee as a tenant-in-common with her on the Dune
Road property rental account to the exclusion of Chuck Hayes. (Trial Tr. R. 884 at p.
124). In addition, Margee's parents were financially secure enough to have purchased
the fifty-percent interest in Dune Road for $325,000 and would likely receive the same
$700,000 appreciation Chuck Hayes would have received if Dune Road sold for its
appraised value. There was no evidence that Margee would be disinherited or had an
adverse standing in her family or that her family would not have made her a beneficiary
of some part of their estate. The implication that she might benefit is not unreasonable.
The District Court acknowledged at a subsequent hearing (as it did in the
Memorandum Decision) that there was no direct evidence that Margee Hayes would
inherit any benefits from her parents related to their substantial interest in the Dune Road
property. To the extent the court committed error by making a reasonable assumption,
i.e., that a sibling may one day inherit from her family, is, if anything, "harmless error."
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Even if the court had not modified or explained its ruling, the statement that "the
increase will likely inure to the benefit of Petitioner though there was no testimony about
her siblings or estate plan of her parents" simply stated the obvious. Any evidence
suggested by Petitioner, proffered during a post-trial motion through Affidavit of the
Petitioner's parents, is outside the scope of this record and should not be accepted or
reviewed by this Court.
The intestate succession laws presume that children will inherit property from
their parents. The implication that Margee might benefit in the future is not
unreasonable. The Trial Court commented, in addition to being a reasonably natural
assumption that she might inherit something, this was not the sole or determinative basis
for his belief on any finding or comment that there was a benefit. "She used it, I think the
testimony was, at times for as much as four months in the year; and that's a great benefit.
So whether or not she is going to inherit, to me, isn't determinative. There have been
benefits." (Transcript of Oral Arguments on Objections, p. 24, R. 887.)
ARGUMENT IV
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN VALUING MARGEE'S
CONDOMINIUM
Even though Margee acknowledges her Park City condominium became marital
property by reason of her deeding it in joint tenancy to Chuck Hayes, she requested of the
Trial Court to treat her now consumed pre-marital property as a separate contribution and
asked that it be returned to her. Using its equitable powers, that is how the Trial Court
decided to treat the Park City condominium even though all parties agreed, and the Court
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had found, that it was marital property. Thus, Chuck Hayes lost a legitimate claim to
one-half of the value of Margee's donation, or $45,000, as of the date of trial. Margee
next urged the Trial Court to credit her back not $90,000, based upon the valuation as of
the date of trial, but $135,000, the value she argued the condominium was worth as of the
date of marriage.
In doing so, she is attempting to shift to Chuck the responsibility for all of the
diminished market value of the condominium which would cost Chuck Hayes another
$45,000. In effect, Margee was able to request the Trial Court use its equitable powers to
return to her, as separate property, an interest that was clearly marital. In doing so, the
Court recognized that Chuck Hayes would be further adversely affected if a marriage
date valuation was used as opposed the trial date valuation.
The Court gave back to Margee, in kind, what she, in fact, had contributed - the
condominium. It had been maintained and improved; therefore, she did receive back a
tangible property that was in as good a condition as it was on the date of marriage.
Chuck Hayes received back his original $55,000 in traced pre-marital cash, which the
Court had earlier determined was not a gift and had come from his separate pre-marital
property.
Petitioner's request would have created a shell game, playing tricks with
valuations. Had the Court used the higher valuation shifting the entire appraised market
loss to Chuck Hayes, he would have lost approximately $235,000 from his pre-marital
status while Margee Hayes would have gained approximately $55,000. {See p. 9, supra.)
The Trial Court adopted the values as of the date of trial in a well-considered approach to
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an equitable allocation of property in this matter. It is clearly within the Court's
discretion to choose an appropriate date to value property and usually that is the trial date.
Rappleye v. Rappleye, 855 P.2d 260, 262 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
It is not fair to criticize an overall equitable allocation by analyzing only a few of
its parts. The overall allocation of property achieved its equitable purpose and cannot be
disturbed on appeal short of a finding of mistake or abuse of discretion.
CONCLUSION
The Trial Court's determinations should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this 2 B day of February, 2006.
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Salt Lake City, UT 84101
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